Password Based Key Derivation Tool








Salt Iteractions Derived key


Password Based Key Derivation Tool

We offer free online Password Based Key Derivation Tool, Our Password Based Key Derivation Tool is an easy and simple tool, by using our Password Based Key Derivation Tool you can generate Password Based Key in just a simple click.

This program differs from the other free password-based key generation tools with which the reader is probably already familiar. The key distinction between this program and the others is that it can produce long-term, complicated passwords.

Password-based key derivation free tools are a great addition to individual users' and organizations' security arsenals. They make it possible to generate new cryptographic keys quickly and easily, eliminating the need to memories long, complex passwords.

What is Password Based Key Derivation?

Many security applications require a password-based key derivation function (KDF), which is a program that generates cryptographic keys from a password. Such KDFs, like other password-based systems, are vulnerable to key search assaults (often called dictionary attacks). In practice, salt and repetition count are used to greatly increase the effort of such assaults. These approaches are also documented in widely used industry standards like PKCS and IETF. Despite their relevance and widespread use, current structures have received little rigorous security study. 

We present a generic security framework for password-based KDFs in this study, as well as two security definitions, each of which captures a distinct attacker scenario. We investigate the most often used construction H (c)(p||s) and demonstrate that the iteration count c, When fixed, it has the effect of lengthening the password p by log2 c bits. The two standardized KDFs are then analyzed in PKCS#5. We demonstrate that both are secure if the attacker cannot modify the parameters but vulnerable otherwise. Finally, we present a novel password-based KDF that is safe even when the attacker has complete control over the parameters.

RFC 2898 defines PBKDF2 as a particular Key Derivation Function (KDF). A key derivation function (KDF) is basically any system for converting a password (something a user remembers or maintains in a password manager) into a symmetric key suitable for cryptographic operations (i.e., AES). This strategy turns out to be incredibly useful for a number of use scenarios. It is, however, not without problems.

PBKDF2 as a hash

One common application for PBKDF2 is to hash a password in order to avoid keeping a plaintext password in a database. It gets slower for an attacker to brute force against your live system or a database dump if you iterate through the hashing method several times. Furthermore, PBKDF2 employs salting, which defends against rainbow table assaults and users who have made the mistake of reusing their password on several sites. However, PBKDF2 is not a complete solution. By deliberately slowing down the ability to compute a hash, it affects more than just the attacker - selecting PBKDF2 involves knowingly squandering CPU resources. While the benefit may outweigh the expense of a PC,

In the mobile arena, where squandering CPU cycles consumes energy, PBKDF2 should be handled with caution. Surprisingly, on initial boot, Android devices employ PBKDF2 to decrypt the device with the user-supplied PIN. Furthermore, PBKDF2 is not immune to ASICs or FPGAs, which are purpose-built hardware designed to do a certain task very effectively in hardware. The x86 architecture is designed to be general purpose, but an attacker with enough money can throw hardware at the problem!

PBKDF2 to decrypt a symmetric key

To avoid hour-long password reset delays, one popular technique is to use PBKDF2's output as a symmetric key that decrypts another symmetric key. This eliminates the need to rekey everything in the system (since it was encrypted by a key that does not need to change). However, this technique allows an application to only have access to those fields during a user session! This is performed by hooking into the user-change password and doing only one re-encryption process - that of the user's primary symmetric key!

PBKDF2 as a symmetric key

Another common application for PBKDF2 is to convert a user-supplied password into a symmetric key appropriate for use with the AES technique. This is based on the fact that AES can accept any value that fulfils specific length and entropy criteria, and that PBKDF2 can output a hash of any length that matches those entropy requirements. This characteristic is quite useful for things like password vaults. A provider can assure that its software can ONLY decrypt sensitive information while the user is logged in by combining PBKDF2 with the user's password at login time. Database dumps, authenticated assaults, and even buffer overflow attacks on the program itself are rendered ineffective by this.

To begin with, browser-based SSO, such as SAML, violates this scheme since it depends on trusted text and does not need the user to enter their password into the relying party application at all! (This may be avoided by having the PBKDF2 input appear as a SAML attribute in the assertion.) Furthermore, when the user changes their password, the application must hook into this event by decrypting everything encrypted with the old password and encrypting it with the new password instead - this is a significant amount of overhead that can result in a password changing experience taking minutes to hours. That's not good!

How PBKDF2 works?

PBKDF2 accepts a password, a salt, an integer determining the number of "iterations" of the hash function to perform, and an integer describing the desired key length for the output as input.

Password: IL0veCrypt0!!! Salt: D04A77B765E5CA3A84AA27C4C1908A72 Iterations: 10,000 Hash Function: SHA256 Desired Key Length: 32 bytes (256 bits) Output: D122D2A917B3EC896214F87CAEC0FBF914D0092423EBFCEBED72ABF82C945AE1

The byte array matching to the above output string can be used as an AES key. It is important to note that by raising the number of iterations (the number of times we execute the HMAC), we purposely make the eventual output more computationally costly. This attribute is beneficial since it reduces an attacker's ability to brute force through the original password's key space (though it does nothing to prevent the attacker from brute forcing the key output itself). This is useful since 256 bits with a high entropy are far more secure than a short password!

Key derivation functions

Using a pseudo-random function, key derivation routines generate bytes appropriate for cryptographic operations from passwords or other data sources (PRF). Different KDFs are appropriate for various jobs, such as:

Derivation of cryptographic keys

Creating a key that may be used as input to an encryption technique. Typically, this entails processing a password via an algorithm such as PBKDF2HMAC or HKDF. This is commonly referred to as key stretching.

Storage of passwords

When saving passwords, you should employ a computationally expensive technique. Legitimate users will only have to compute it once (for example, by taking the user's password, passing it through the KDF, and comparing it to the stored value), but attackers will have to do it billions of times. Ideal password storage KDFs will be computationally and memory-intensive.


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